WHEN AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM FAILS AT DEVELOPMENT: WHAT HUNGARY’S ACCUMULATIVE STATE AND THE EXHAUSTION OF ORBÁNISM TEACH US

Why do some authoritarian capitalist regimes fail at development despite wielding robust state power? Existing explanations rooted in liberal institutionalism reduce this failure to rent-seeking, while developmental authoritarianism expects that centralised power enables long-horizon transformation. This article draws on the concept of the accumulative state to offer a new interpretation of why authoritarian capitalism fails to promote development. The accumulative state is a distinct state formation that actively builds institutions and intervenes coherently in markets, yet subordinates state capacity to the short-term interests of the coalition that sustains it, thereby failing at structural upgrading. The framework identifies three mechanisms through which the accumulative state reproduces dependency: economic disintegration, social disintegration, and vulnerability to external shocks. Drawing on the rise and fall of Orbánism in Hungary as a paradigmatic case, the article traces how this configuration deepened economic dualism, redistributed income upward while repressing labour, and left the regime fatally exposed when, after 2020, compounding external shocks severed its lifelines. The analysis offers broader lessons for development studies and comparative political economy about the limits of authoritarian capitalism.